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ABSTRACT 
Based on the faihre probability, the flaw acceptaao~ standard of ASME 
Code Sec. XI is examined with some concerns weather tbe faihre 
l~vbabflity is unif~in for flaws with various aspect ratios and failure 
frcquoneies are small enough. In this paper, the results of lreliminmy case 
studies are deseff0ed on liae failure probability of n~etor pressure vessels 
(RPVs) with a surface flaw specified in Scc. XI. PFM code PASCAL was 
used for case studies. A PTS (Pressurized Thermal Shock) Iransient 
prescn'bcd by NRC2EPRI ITS Benchmark Study was used as an applied 
load. 
Analysis results showcd that the conditional failure probability of a 
RPV wilh ~m initial flaw of acceptable depth depends on the aspect mlio. h 
case flaw' shapes ~ze close to semi-circular, the failme probability are 
higher than that of the eases aspect ration are less than 0.6 by one order of 
magnitude due to the diffczeace of fracture behavior at the surface point. A 
case study for determining the acceptable flaws based on failure probability 
was also eanied ont 
INTRODUCTION 
A soreening standard of small flaws, detected by ISI (In-Sca'vice 
Inspection), tl~ have no significant influence on the structural integrity of 
Class 1 eornponcnls through plant life is preson'bed in the flaw acceptance 
standard of ASME B&PV Code See. XI [1]. This standard has bee, 
dctmnincd based on the postulated crack size in the design requirement for 
protecting a RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) against aae non.ductile fracture. 
The acceptance standard for the RPV of an opemling nuclear power plant 
was determined based on the flaw size of one tenth of the lX~_~!atedl crack 
at design. Acceptable flaw depths for various aspect ratios were 
determined based on the slress intatsity factor of each crack under a nomml 
operational load [2]. 
Recently, on the other hand, a probabilistic methodology based on risk 
information is being introduced in regulations aad codes related to the 
structural integrity in USA. Sane concerns from the viewpoint of 
probab~'c rnethodology agaiost the deterministic flaw accel0Cance slandard 
are weather the faiha~ ixubability is uaiform for each flaw with diffeamt 
aspect ratio, faihrc frequency is small enough, and how the non-deteaion 
probability of impeaion cx~rnparcs against acceptable flaws. Furthamore, 
lhc use of probab~'c methods in determining failure may provide more 
rational basis for the acceptable flaws. 'nae failure probability based on the 
probabilistic approach may be a good index for determining the acceptable 
flaws. 
In order to address the above issues, a stody was initiated on tbe f, filure 
probability of a RPV with a surface flaw speeitied in the flaw acceptance 
standmd of Scc.XI by using the PFM code PASCAL (PFM Analysis of 
S~ructml Componn~s in Aging LWR) [3-6]. Arts (r~d "naermal 
Shock) Izmasicra prescdbed by NRC/EPRI PTS I~cbmark Problem [7] 
was applied as a transia~t load. Analyses wcfc performed for flaws with 
various aspect ralios with the parameter of neutron flueace. An evahation of 
RPV with a flaw which has Marshall flaw distfibulion [8] was also 
performed to compare tbe faihre l~bebili~. In addition, a study was also 
canied out to construct the acceptable flaws based on the faihre probability 
CASE STUDIES ON FAILURE PROBABH.,ITY OFARPV 
(1) Flaw Acceptan~ Standard of ASME Code S e c ~  
The flaw acceptance stmadard meson'bed by Sec.XI is detnminedt~xi 
on the postulamd emek si,.e in the design requirnnent of See.IlI for 
protecting a RPV against the non-ductile fmcttae. Speeitiealb, the integrity 
o f a  RPV is confirmed using a postulated flaw size of dcffda equal to 
one-quarter offlae thickness and aspect ratio of 1/3 (a/b, a: tiaw depth., b: half 
surface length) at the service level A and B load, while the acceptable flaw 
size with aspect ratio of a/b=l/3 for the RPV of m operating plant is 
dcttamined to be oneae~ of the postuhl~d crack size atlhe design. For 
other flaws with diff~a~a~ aspect ralios, acceptable depths am detmnined by 
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making the stress intemity factors even. 
It was confirmed that acceptable flaws of this standard give nearly 
uniform stress intensity factors for all aspect ratios under a normal operating 
load andthat ~ stress imraity factors at ~ deqxst point is larg= thaa that 
Of the surface point up to aspect ratio a/b=0.8, while the stress intmsity factor 
at the stafaee poira becomes larger than that Of deepest point above a/b=0.8 
[2]. 
Figure 1 shows the acceptable flaw depth of ferritic vessels with wall 
lhicknoss oflOGm~ to 300ram. 'Ihe acceptable flaw depths are about 2 % to 
5 % Of wall thickness depending on the aspect ratio. AS sbown in Fig. 1,the 
original standard ~ablished in 1974ed. was altered to aceept deeper flaws in 
high aspect ratios in the revision of 1983ed. 
(2) PFM analyses on the flaw acceptance standard of ASME Code See.. 
XI under a PTS transieat 
P r e m e i ~  Thmnal Shock (PTS) is eonsidered to be one Of 0ae most 
severe everas for a RPV of PWK The integ6ty of a RPV has tobe secaned 
evea under such ewes. In this study, analyses of failure probabilities of a 
RPV with a flaw which meet the accq.,~ee standard was performed under a 
severe PTS Wansieat which was osed by NI1C/EPRI PTS bemhmark study 
[7]. This PTS ~ s i m t  is &:t~mined by USNRC as representative of F r s  
evmts. In addition, 0ae ~h~e probabifity of a RPV with the flaw depth Of 
Mazshall distn'bution [8] shown in Table 1 is also examined. The frequency 
Of Small Break Loss of  Coolant Accident (SBI_.OCA) was evaluated to be 
104to lff3 per reactor ymr by the review Of initiating evont in USA [9]. The 
SBL(X~A is one of the initialing events of PTS and a postulated pipe break 
Of a small bore piping is applied to assess the integrity of RPV. The ffiequmey 
of the Wamiet~ applied in this study, which causes more severe load than that 
ofltae SBLOCA, maybe around l0 "4 per reactor year or low~. 
analysis input for the geomeey, mataial properties and other 
lrammetcts are shown in Table 1. Figtae 2 shows the input thetIml hydraulic 
tnmsimt of NRC/EPRI PTS transimt and the time history of stress 
distn'bution along wan thickness obtained by FEM ~alysis. 
PFM code PASCAL [3-6], which has been developed in the flame 
work of file aging research program at Japan Atomic Energy Research 
Imtitute~ was used for the analyses Of failm~ probab~ity Based on Monte 
Carlo simulati~, this code evaluates the conditional probability of crack 
and failure (through wall crack) of a pressure vessel subjected to a 
lransier~ loading The tirne histories of temperature and stress distr~ution 
along the wan thickness were obtained by an input data ~ a t o r  of 
PASCAL Figure 3 shows the time history of stress distn'bulion. 
Four eases OfPFM ~malyses were IXfformed as shown in Fig.3. In Case 
1 and Case 2, the analyses Of failtae probability of a RPV with inith~l flaws of 
the aeeeptable deplhs in See.XI or a flaw with Mmshall distribution[8] were 
carried out In Case 1, the intatanental crack extrusion both in the surfaee and 
thieknoss direetiom are evaluated. As Case 1 analysis exactly follows the 
crack extrusion process, a reliable semi-elliptical caack extension behavior 
can be oblah~ed. On the eontmrg in Case 2, the emek initiation at the deepest 
poira of initi'fl smface flaw is evfluated taxi the initial flaw is replaced by an 
infinite crack subsequently to the crack initialion at the deepest point Case2 
simulates the failure analysis in which the crack iniliaaqm onlY at llae deepest 
point is comideted and corresponds to the acceptable flaw sizes with aspect 
ratios 0.0 to 0.8. 
For Case 1M and Case 1Mac shown in Fig.4, the analysis of a RPV 
wilh an initial flaw Of Marshall &pth dislribution was ca.rried out In Case 
1Mac, lhe upper truncation oftlaw depth was set at the acceptable flaw depth 
of ASME See.XI. Thus the analysis results with upper limit of acceptable 
flaw depths we compared with the case without upper limit 
In each ease, one longitudinal smface flaw is ~umed and the failure 
tnobabilities were calculated for some fast neutron fluencc levels fitn~ 0.5 to 
5.0 n/cm 2. Maximum flumee of 5.0 Wcna 2 was presumed to correspond to 
~d-of-life-ttuence of aged PWR RPVs. 
In addition to the above probabilistic amlyses, deterministic failure 
analyses were imformed to eo~are the mere fracture toughness vs. 
l~mpcraturc curves for differea'Mlumces with loci of stress intmsity factom at 
the deepea point and surface point under the appliedtmasimt 
(3) Results of ~se stttdies 
0 Detmm~a'e malysis 
Two cases of det=li "makca'c analyses with aspect ratios a/b=0.4 and 0.8 
ate shown in Fig. 5. In general, the stress intemity factor at the deepest point 
is linger than that of the surface point ffthe flaw aspect ratio is small and the 
stress intemity factor at the surface point increases with aspect ratio. As 
shown in Fig.5, the locus of stress intmsity factor at the surface point for 
aspect ratio 0.8 is higher thaa that of the deepest point On the other hand, the 
trend of the stress intmsity faetoxs are opposite to aspect ratio 0.8 in case of 
aspect ratio 0.4. Figure 5 also suggests that the neutron fluenee about 5 × 10 t9 
n/cm2 is critical to osme the crack initiation at the surface point for aspect 
ratio 0.8. For other cases, the crack initiation does not happen 
d e t e r r n ~ ' ~ .  
2) Failure probability Ofa RPV with an initial flaw Of the acceptame standard 
byASMZSec~ 
Figure 6 shows the failure probability of a vessel with an inilial flaw of 
acceptable flaw for various aspect ratios. The ~ probabilities scatter 
about ~ac ontcr of magnitude. This means that cvm though the stress 
intmsity facwrs of initial flaws for various aspect ra~os against ~ operational 
load, failure probabilities are not unifoim under a seveae PTS event. The 
failure probabilities for aspect ratio Of 0.1 are minimum and those for 0.8 are 
mar&num. The diffenmce between two curves is nearly one order of 
magnitude in low flumce. 
Figure 7 shows the failme probability vs. aspect ratio to detmninc liac 
dependemy on the initial flaw aspect ratio for Case 1 and Case 2. Bofla cases 
give identical and reasonably uniform faiinre probability up to aspect ratio 
0.6. Onthe other trend, above 0.6, the ditfenmce in failure probabiiVdes is 
large.InCase 1, the crack initi~ion and ineremmtal crack extemion analyses 
both in the surface mad wall-thickness direction perfottned, while the crack 
initiation at the surface point is not takm into accoura in Case 2. As Case 1 
follows crack initiation and extension conscientiously, Fig. 7 indicates that 
Case 2 analysis gives an uneonservative evalu~ion of failure probability for 
aspect ratio above 0.6 under a severe PTS transient. The maximum 
difference between Case 1 and case 2 is larger more than one order of 
magnitude. 
As described in 2.1 mad 2.2, the acceptable flaw depths up to aspect 
ratios 0.8 are determined by the stress intensity factor at the deepest point 
under a Service Level A and B, and Case 2 simulates the failure analysis in 
which the crack initiatkm only at lhe deepest poira is consid~ed, the 
discrepancies of failure probabilities at aspect ratios 0.6 to 1.0 as shown in 
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Fig 7 reveal lhat the flaw acceptance standard for surface flaw allows this 
diffmmcc of failure probability trader a severe PTS transient Thus, the 
discussion by which mmsient should be applied for detmnining the 
acceptable flaw depth should be important, because the determination of 
acceptable flaw depth depends on applied transient. 
A slight dependency on the flumce level can also be seen. This 
dependemy is camed due to the diffmmce of fluemes between surface and 
deepestlx,im 
3) Failu~ probabili(l~s o f a  RPV with an initial flaw depth of Marshall 
distribution 
In order to study the influence of flaw depth distribution m the fa~ure 
probabflitg a vessd with Marshall flaw distribution was examimd. In this 
studg two cases, i.e., Case IM andCase 1Mac, wen e~a~m~d. InCase 1M, 
failure probabilities of a RPV with Mamhall disto'bufion was calculated, 
while in Case IMae, ~ distribution with an g~Ix~ (mncafion at the 
acceptable flaw depth was examined. 
The f~ilure probabililies for Czse IM and Case 1Mac me ~.~,ared in 
Fig.8. It is seen that the failure probabilities in Case 1Mac me ~naller lhan 
that ofCase IM bythe 1 to3 ordem of magnitude. 'nais meam lhat the 
standard of Sec.XI allows a flaw which gives the lower failure probability of 
1/100 to 1/10 lhan tl~tt by Mmshall flaw distn'butiort 
STUDY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF ACCEFFABLE FLAWS 
BASED ON FAILURE PROBABK,ITY 
As descn'bed above, it was ~ that the fai l~ probables ofa RPV 
with an initial flaw of the acceptable depth speeitied in Sec.XI weze not 
uniforra under tbe PTS mmsient and depmded not only on (he flaw aspect 
ratio but analysis algorithm (Casel or Case2). From the concept of 
probabflislie methodology, it may be reasonable to define the acceptable flaw 
against a severe load appfied to an aged RPV, because ~ aged RPV has to 
seaae the integity under such eonditiort Based on this premise, a 
nxxtiticalion of the acceptance standard of Sec.XI is studied as desen'bed 
below 
The ~ faihffe probability at file neutrorl fll.le~lce of 5.0 × 1019 n/arn 2 
for in i~  flaw del~hs with aspect raio a/b= 0.0 to 1.0 was used as the target 
failure probability prest~mag that the tlumce of 5.0 n/era 2 corresponds to 
end-of-lifo-ttuence of aged PWR RPVs. The flaw deptla for each aspoct ralio 
was determined by semitivity analyses. 
In Fig 9 the acceptable flaw dep(h vs. aspect ratio determined by Ibis 
study ate companM with that of Sce.XI. Flaw depths ~e smaller than those 
of Scc. XI above aspect ralio 0.7, while deeper flaws ~ those of SccXI 
can be accepted below 0.6. As the aeceptable flaw depth is determined at the 
ttuence level of 5× 1019 B/cm 2, the dependellcy of faihue probability on 
noatmn flumce is examined as shown in Fig. 10. In Fig. 10, the conditional 
failure l~ity off a RPV 'with an acceptable flawby Sec.XI shown in 
Fig.7 is also compartK Though failu~ probabilities are constar~ for all aspect 
ralios ofttuence 5.0× 10 t9 n/era 2, failure probabiliti~ ~a'~ not COlxstant arid a 
811"lall deviation fFom eonsl2111t valug is . ~ 1  below flLIl~lCe 5.0 X 1019 B/£1112. 
The deviation ffi~om a constara failure probability of each tlucace depmds on 
tlumce level. This deviation becomes slightly larger for lower tlumce. A 
ooiulramtive diffemace exists in neutron in'adialkm embrittlement, rmaely 
ffimm toughness, betwem surface point and deepest point due to 
attenuation of flumce along vessel wall. 'Ibis diff~amce in fracture toughness 
between surface point Ixmd deepest point is largest in the case of fluence 0.5 
X 1019 n/art 2. Though this situation may result in the above deviation in 
failure probability, the deviation is not significant because the failure 
probabilities are reasonably uniform for all ttuences. 
CONCLUSION 
A prdimimry study for establishing the flaw acceptance standard based 
on fallme probability was described. The flaw acceptance standard of ASME 
Code See. XI has been examined from the viewpoint of failure l~vbability 
under a severe ITS tmx.~ent by using PFM code PASCAL 'Ilae failure 
probabilities of a vessel with m init~ flaw specified by ASME Code Sec. XI 
md subjected to the smae flumce considerably delxmds on tbe initial flaw 
aspect ralio. The result of case studies shows that the crack initiation at the 
surface point of a semi-elliptical flaw is significant under a I r is  load ffthe 
flaw aspect ratio is large. 'rims, the discussion by which nmsicra should be 
applied for detmnining O~e accep~le flaw depth is iml~tant 
"Ihe results for the case on a RPV with Mamhall flaw distribtaion 
suggests that the acceptmc¢ standard of Scc.XI allows a flaw which gives 
the faikne probability of 1/100 to 1/10 than that described by Mamhall flaw 
distribution. 
A study to amstnm the acceptable flaw standard based on failure 
p~bab~ity was also investigated. In ~ study, flaw depths with diffemat 
aspect ratios which gave a constant failure probability were determined under 
the PTS Iransicnt at the neutron ttucnceof5 × 1019 n/(~rl 2. 
Though the results obtained by this study suggest that the acceptable 
flaw can be determined more rationally based on failure probability, 
following items should be examined as the future works for establishing the 
revised flaw aeceplance stmdard based on failure probability. 
• Study on tlae role of oveday cladding 
• Study on the effect of application ofclasto-plastic fracture criterion on the 
crack arrest behavior in upper shelftemperature. 
• Discussion of the applied wamimt, i.e., Service level A, B or C, D, for 
determining the acceptable flaw depth 
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Fig.2 Transient of fluid temperature surface temperature and pressure 
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Fig. 3 Stress distribution duringthe PTS transient 
Case 1 Case 2 
Case 1: Incremental crack extension both to the surface and thickness direction is evaluated. 
An exact crack extension 
behavior can be followed. 
Case 2: Crack extension only to thickness direction is evaluated. The initial flaw is replaced 
by an ktfinite edge crack subsequent to crack initiation. (Simple simulation ot 
ffailure at deepest point ) 
Initial flaw for various aspect ratios: 
Case 1; Initial flaw with acceptable depth byASME See.IX 
Case 1 M; Initial flaw depth with Marshall distn'bution 
Case 1Mac; Initial flaw depth with Marshall distribution with an upper truncation at the flaw 
depth ofASME SecXI. 
Case 2: Initial flaw with acceptable depth byASME See.XI 
Fig 4 Analysis cases to determine failure probability 
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Fig.5 Results of deterministic failure analysis for initial flaws with aspect ratio 0.4 and 0.8 
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Fig.6 Conditional failure probability (Case 1 ) of a RPV with an acceptable flaw of ASME Code Sec.XI 
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Fig.7 Comparison of failure probabilities between Case 1 and Case 2 
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Fig. 8 Comparison of failure probabilities between Case 1M and Case 1Mac 
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Fig.lO Comparison of failure pmbabifity vs. aspect ratio curves between ASME See.X] and present study 
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